Gender
Based Taxation (GBT) satisfies Ramsey’s optimal criterion by taxing
less the more elastic labor supply of women. This holds when different
elasticities between men and women are taken as exogenous and
primitive. We study GBT in a model in which, instead, elasticity
differences emerge endogenously from the bargained allocation of family
duties. We explore two polar cases, which summarize the channels
through which GBT affects an economy encompassing a wider set of
possible reasons for gender differences. In the first case, the
allocation of family chores is uneven between spouses because men have
a superior bargaining power. In the second, instead, women take up more
chores because they have a comparative advantage in household
activities. We show how GBT emerges as an optimal policy tool as result
of the interaction between incentives within the family and the Ramsey
criterion, which is internalized by the government but not by household
members.

Source: Lawrence Solum