Blackman on Originalism and Heller
Josh Blackman (George Mason University – School of Law) has posted Originalism for Dummies, Pragmatic Unoriginalism, and Passive Liberty: An Originalist Critique of the Heller Dissents and Judges Posner’s and Wilkinson’s Unoriginalist Assault on the Liberty to Keep and Bear Arms on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
In a
5-4 opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, District of Columbia v.
Heller was a landmark case that recognized the individual right to keep
and bear arms under the Second Amendment. This case generated vast
waves of controversy. In addition to vigorous dissents from Justices
Stevens and Breyer, Judges J. Harvie Wilkinson III and Posner also
wrote stinging rebukes of this case. The purpose of this article is not
to dissect Heller, or anticipate how future Second Amendment cases will
be resolved after Heller. Rather my aim is to explore the
jurisprudential archetypes exemplified in the Heller dissents, as well
as in the articles from Judges Posner and Wilkinson, and analyze how
these philosophies fail to protect our liberty.The article
proceeds as follows. In Part I, I provide a brief sketch of the
majority and dissenting opinions in District of Columbia v. Heller, as
well as the articles from Judges Posner and Wilkinson. Next I explain
the relevance of focusing on common law history when deciding
Constitutional cases, and introduce the jurisprudence of originalism.In
Part II, I focus on Justice Stevens’s dissent in Heller. Justice
Stevens fails to consider the history behind the Second Amendment,
including centuries of common law history from the Magna Carta, through
the English Bill of Rights, until the Revolutionary War. Further,
Justice Stevens fails to recognize the recent outpouring in original
scholarship on the history of the Second Amendment. Rather than
ascertaining the original public meaning, he focuses almost exclusively
on the drafting history, and improperly attempts to guess the
intentions of our framers. Relying on what I have termed the Seven
Dirty Words of Intentionalism leads his analysis astray. His opinion is
guilty of what I have dubbed, tongue-in-check, Originalism for Dummies.In
Part III, I trace the history of our fundamental liberty to keep and
bear arms from the dawn of our Republic, through the Antebellum South.
The right to keep and bear arms was a vital protection for freedmen in
the face of the Klan and the Jim Crow South, and was an essential
element of debates surrounding the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The individual rights interpretation of the Second Amendment
persisted until the mid-twentieth century. This break in history
created the line of precedents that led up to Heller.
In Part
IV, I discuss Justice Breyer’s dissent. Applying his own active liberty
framework, I will show that Justice Breyer should be eager to protect
the right to keep and bear arms and the second amendment, much like he
does many other ancient liberties. Yet, based on his unbalanced and
skewed balancing test, he unsurprisingly does not deem the liberty to
keep and bear arms worthwhile for judicial enforcement. I explore this
inherent contradiction to reveal that in many cases, active liberty is
a codeword for mere opportunism.In Part V, I analyze Judge
Posner’s pragmatically unoriginalist critique of Heller. Judge Posner
fails to properly grasp the original public meaning branch of
originalism. Rather, he seeks to redefine originalism based on his own
"loose construction" version of pragmatism. Further, Judge Posner
argues that the Second Amendment should mean one thing in an urban
area, and a different thing in a rural area. Such an arbitrary
definition of liberty does not comport with the nature of our
Constitution. Finally, Judge Posner disregards originalism as a
jurisprudence because judges are not historians, and can only engage in
"law office history." However, this discounts the impact that
professional historians have on originalist analyses. In addition, in
many other contexts judges are forced to reply on experts (intellectual
property, securities cases, etc.). Originalism should be no different.In
Part VI, I focus on Judge Wilkinson’s more nuanced critique of Heller.
I take on his argument that the political process should be responsible
for protecting the right to keep arms, and show how this view does not
comport with modern Constitutional jurisprudence, and Footnote Four of
Carolene Products in particular. Further, I disagree with Judge
Wilkinson about the Second Amendment being an "ambiguous" right, and
argue that it deserves the same protections as other liberties in the
Bill of Rights. I conclude with a brief discussion of liberty and the
right to arms.
My take on Heller and originalist theory can be found here.
Source: Lawrence Solum
